Abstract-We estimate the impact of incentive strength on achievement under a group-based teacher incentive pay program. The system provides variation in the share of students in a subject-grade that a teacher instructs, which proxies for incentive strength. We find that achievement on incentivized exams, but not nonincentivized exams, improves when incentives strengthen. For the incentivized exams, we find that effects fade out monotonically as a teacher's portion of the group increases to between 20 and 30 percentage and are larger for teachers with low-achieving students. Calculations based off these estimates show modest positive effects of the program overall.
I. Introduction
T EACHER incentive pay has become an increasingly popular education policy in the United States and throughout the rest of the world, underscored by the rapid rise in the number of states and school districts adopting such policies, as well as their importance in President Obama's Race to the Top education initiative. However, at least in a developed country context, the results from several recent randomized controlled trials suggest that linking teacher pay to their students' academic performance does little to raise student achievement (Fryer, 2013; Goodman & Turner, 2013; Fryer et al., 2012; Springer et al., 2010) . 1 The lack of effects found in these studies is consistent with teachers being unresponsive to financial incentives for improving student outcomes. Alternatively, the design of these incentive schemes could have limited their ability to raise test scores. Currently, little is known about how the specific design aspects of teacher incentive pay programs, such as group size, the outcome measure being incentivized, and the payment structure, influence the effectiveness of these systems in raising student academic achievement. 2 It is critical to understand how these design features impact incentives' effectiveness in order to construct incentive pay programs that provide properly powered and salient incentives for workers.
We focus on a particularly important aspect of group-based teacher incentive pay design, the percent of students in a group a teacher instructs, in order to shed needed light on the role of a core design feature. Due to the stated desire of teachers to foster an environment of cooperation and collaboration, group-based incentive pay systems that pay teachers based on grade-or school-specific performance on standardized exams in a given subject are the most common in education. A potential drawback of providing rewards based on group performance, however, is the 1/n problem (Holmstrom, 1982; Kandel & Lazear, 1992) , which can lead teachers in larger groups to be less responsive to financial incentives. The 1/n problem is driven by a combination of free riding and award salience. Free riding occurs in groupbased incentives because each worker has an incentive to reduce his or her effort and consume more leisure in response to the expected benefit received from the effort of others in the group. Award salience is a related but distinct mechanism, whereby the strength of the incentive is reduced as the group size increases because the worker's own effort has a smaller and smaller impact on the likelihood of award receipt. 3 Prior research on group-based incentives has treated each group as a homogeneous unit, assuming everyone in the group faces the same incentives. For teachers, when awards are determined by average student outcomes within the group, the strength of an incentive can vary within a group and is a function of the share of the group the teacher teaches. We focus on this "share" measure throughout and show that it is a more salient measure of incentive strength than the size of the group (i.e., the number of teachers) in our data.
Nonetheless, group size can still play a direct role in driving teacher responses to group-based incentive pay. Larger groups, for example, may encourage more cooperation and coordination of teaching strategies across teachers or induce teachers to take advantage of efficiencies of scale through technology spillovers and team teaching. Group size may affect peer monitoring as well, which could either increase or decrease the effect of group-based monetary incentives depending on whether peer monitoring is stronger or weaker in larger groups. 4 Taken together, these mechanisms indicate that how individual performance responds to groupbased incentives is an empirical question about which little currently is known across labor markets, and especially with regard to teachers.
In this paper, we test directly for whether the strength of a group-based incentive a teacher faces affects her productivity using the implementation of the ASPIRE teacher incentive pay program in the Houston Independent School District (HISD). 5 In the 2007-2008 school year, HISD implemented a rank-order tournament incentive pay program at the school-grade-subject group level for high schools that pays groups based on their value-added rank in math, English, science, and social studies exams. The awards are allocated using a rank-order tournament for each subject, with sharp cutoffs in award amounts at the 50th and 75th percentiles of the district-wide, subject-grade, value-added distribution. The award amounts are substantial: the maximum award in the 2009-2010 school year was $7,700. 6 Our empirical analysis tests whether teachers who are responsible for a larger share of students in each grade and subject generate more achievement gains after implementation of the award system than those who are responsible for teaching fewer students. Under a group incentive scheme, the share of students a teacher instructs is a strong proxy for incentive strength because as the teacher share increases, a teacher's impact on the probability of award receipt rises (i.e., the award salience increases) and free-rider incentives decline. Thus, our key explanatory variable is the share of a subject-school-grade cell enrolled in each teacher's classes, and we identify how the effect of this share changes when the incentive pay program is implemented using a differencein-differences methodology. By controlling for pre-ASPIRE share, lagged student test scores, student demographics, and school-year and grade-year fixed effects, we argue that our empirical models account for the nonrandom sorting of students into classrooms with teachers of differing quality and who teach a larger or smaller share of students. The key identifying assumption we invoke is that the effect of share taught on student achievement is not shifting systematically when the incentive system is implemented for reasons not having to do with the program. We present extensive evidence that this assumption holds in our data by examining direct measures of both student and teacher sorting, showing the robustness of our estimates to the use of different sources of share variation that are each subject to different potential biases from endogenous sorting, and using instruments for post-ASPIRE share based on pre-ASPIRE share levels and pre-ASPIRE department sizes that are not subject to biases from endogenous sorting.
Our results across the various specifications and methodologies provide consistent evidence that student performance increases more post-ASPIRE among those whose teachers are responsible for a larger share of students. The estimates are largest for math, where we find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of students taught post-ASPIRE increases test scores by 0.024 standard deviations. A similar increase in teacher share increases achievement in English and social studies by 0.014 and 0.020 standard deviations, respectively. There is no effect on science scores on average. We show as well that teachers shift their focus across grades in response to the program, such that among students in different grades in the same year with the same teacher, test performance increases more for the students in the higher-share grade. These results point to teacher productivity increasing as financial incentives become stronger. We further find that impacts are larger for teachers whose students are on average low achievers. This is the first study in the teacher incentive pay literature to identify heterogeneous effects across different student types, and our results indicate that teacher incentive pay can reduce educational inequality when it is structured appropriately.
The change in the relationship between teacher share and student test scores when ASPIRE was enacted is unlikely to be linear due to the fact that free-rider effects are much larger at lower shares and that the marginal return to effort is decreasing in effort. Hence, we estimate local linear regression models that allow for the changing effect of share due to ASPIRE to vary nonparametrically over the distribution of share. We find evidence of much heterogeneity: our estimates show that there are large, positive effects of increasing share on achievement at low shares in all four subjects post-ASPIRE and that this effect declines with share. The effect of increasing share by 10 percentage points is between 0.05 and 0.09 standard deviations at very low shares and falls until reaching 0 at shares between 0.2 to 0.3. Our results thus suggest that there are large returns in terms of student achievement to incentivizing smaller groups of teachers but that these returns disappear as group sizes decline sufficiently. Notably, the New York City school-based teacher incentive pay experiment (Fryer, 2013; Goodman & Turner, 2013) used group sizes that imply average shares well below 0.2. 7 In order to test whether our results are driven by variation in incentive strength or in peer monitoring and cooperation that are more likely a function of the number of teachers in each group, we also estimate local linear regression models controlling for both teacher share and the number of teachers in the group. Conditional on share, we find little evidence of a role for department size except in English. These estimates point to little scope for cooperation and monitoring to play a significant role in driving group size effects in teacher incentive pay systems. 7 While our results are suggestive that the lack of effects found in the group-based incentive pay literature is due to large group sizes, they cannot speak to the ineffectiveness of individual incentive pay (Fryer et al., 2012; Springer et al., 2010) . We discuss the implications of our findings for the broader teacher incentive pay literature as well as some mechanisms that could lead individual incentive pay to poorly incentivize teachers in section VII.
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Finally, we make use of a series of exams that are not incentivized to test whether the impacts occur only on the directly incentivized exams. These results indicate that teachers may be teaching to the test rather than increasing general knowledge, although we cannot rule out that these differences arise from a lack of topical overlap between the incentivized and nonincentivized exams.
While our focus is on the design aspects of incentive pay, in order to align our analysis with the rest of the literature, we use our estimates to calculate a lower-bound total program effect on the incentivized exams. Using the local linear regression estimates, we find achievement increased by a minimum of between 3 percent (in English) and 10 percent (in social studies) of a standard deviation in HISD high schools as a result of the group incentives. Overall, the results from this analysis indicate that design features matter a lot in determining how effective an incentive system is in increasing productivity. These findings underscore the importance of focusing on such design issues in future work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the previous literature on teacher incentive pay and group size effects in incentive pay programs. In section III, we describe the HISD incentive pay program and discuss our data in section IV. We present our empirical methodology in section V. All results are discussed in section VI, and section VII concludes.
II. Previous Literature
The prior literature on teacher incentive pay mostly focuses on group-level incentives. However, these studies typically examine whether there is an average effect of these incentive pay systems on student achievement, not how individuals respond to their specific incentives for increasing output. 8 Lavy (2002) studies a schoolwide performance incentive program in Israeli public schools implemented in 1995. Schools received bonuses based on dropout rates, the average number of credit units per student, and the proportion of students receiving a matriculation certificate. His main finding is that the school-based incentives led to an increase in student test scores, a decrease in dropout rates, and an increase in the proportion of students receiving a matriculation certificate. He does not examine whether teachers in schools with more teachers are more or less responsive to the implementation of the award system. Lavy (2009) studies another incentive pay tournament in Israel that was individual-teacher based and finds that test taking, passing, and high school exit math test scores increased significantly due to teachers' exposure to financial incentives. While Israel is a developed country, there are substantial differences between the Israeli and U.S. public education systems, making it unclear how relevant these findings are to the educational environment we study. 9 In addition, experimental studies in developing countries have found positive effects of both group and individual incentive pay on student outcomes (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011; Glewwe, Ilias & Kremer, 2010; Duflo, Hanna, & Ryan, 2012) , although Behrman et al. (2012) find impacts only when teacher incentives are combined with student incentives. Nonetheless, these estimates are difficult to generalize to a more developed country context due to large cross-country differences in educational systems.
In the United States, several studies have use randomized experiments to assess the average impact of school-level group incentive pay in New York (Fryer, 2013; Goodman & Turner, 2013) and individual incentive pay in Nashville, Tennessee (Springer et al., 2010) . They find no significant impact of teacher incentives on student performance on average. Sojourner, Mykerezi and West (forthcoming) examine the effect of Minnesota's Q-Comp pay-for-performance system. In this system, schools enact a set of human resource reforms, including incentive pay, that are based on a wide array of outcomes that vary across schools. They find small but significant positive effects of opting into this system, but the design of the program does not allow them to disentangle the effects due to the human resource reforms from the incentive pay impacts. Ladd (1999) estimates the effect of a school-based, rank-order incentive pay system that was implemented in Dallas from 1991 through 1995. She compares trends in academic achievement in Dallas to schools in other large cities over this period and shows evidence that academic performance in Dallas rose relative to these other cities. However, her empirical methodology cannot differentiate between incentive effects and differential secular trends or shocks across cities. 10 Finally, Fryer et al. (2012) conduct an experiment that gave some teachers individual-based award bonuses and other teachers fixed cash payouts prior to the school year that were then required to be returned if performance was low. Consistent with much of the literature, they find no significant impacts from the first group, but they do find improvements from the second group, suggesting that loss aversion is a more powerful incentive than standard pay for performance. This paper highlights how the design of a program matters.
The study most closely related to our own is Goodman and Turner (2013) . They use variation in the number of math and English teachers in each school in a school-level randomized teacher incentive pay experiment in New York City to examine whether the effect of the incentives vary with group size. They present evidence that achievement declined slightly in larger schools and may have increased by a small amount in smaller schools. However, given that the groups were all schoolwide, they cannot test whether the differences in responsiveness by school size are causally related to group size or whether they are due to school attributes that are correlated with school size. Furthermore, they are unable to examine whether there are nonlinear or heterogeneous effects of group size or whether there are impacts on nonincentivized exams that can be substantially different from impacts on incentivized exams. Finally, their teachers have lower student shares on average, which we show to be an important factor in the effectiveness of the incentive. Nonetheless, the results from their analysis point to the potentially important role that group size and a teacher's share of students in a group play in determining how teachers respond to group-based incentives. 11 Outside of education, there has been more work examining how group incentive schemes influence productivity. Prendergast (1999) provides an overview of this literature. Several of these studies suggest that workers respond less to group incentives when they are part of a larger group (Newhouse, 1973; Leibowitz & Tollison, 1980; Gaynor & Pauly, 1990) . 12 While suggestive of the existence of free-rider behavior, none of these analyses are able to control fully for the endogeneity of group size nor do they have exogenous variation in award amounts (i.e., in the returns to effort). Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) do have exogenous variation driven by a garment plant switching from individual to group-based piece rate pay. They find positive productivity effects of this switch, which are due to increased worker cooperation. Similarly, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2010, 2013) show that group incentives can increase worker productivity through altering the composition of teams. Since groups in our context are based on grade and subject within a school, such endogenous team formation is unlikely to occur in the short run and thus would have a negligible effect on our results.
Despite the sizable previous literature on group-based merit pay, little is known about how the strength of group incentives affects worker behavior. In education in particular, scant attention has been paid to the effects of group-based teacher incentive pay on teacher effort when there are many 11 Ahn (2011) also presents evidence that free riding may exist in group incentive pay systems in education. He estimates a structural model of teacher effort and student achievement in which he proxies for teacher effort with teacher absences to analyze a school-level incentive pay system in elementary schools in North Carolina. He estimates free-rider effects by simulating optimal effort responses by teachers in response to a change from school-to classroom-level incentives. While his parameter estimates point to an increase in average bonus receipt, average teacher effort declines due to a change in which teachers find themselves marginal to an award threshold. These estimates are consistent with a role for group size, but they are only suggestive because he is unable to disentangle group-size effects from changes in the marginal incentives of teachers.
12 Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor (2004) show that group-based incentives to cut costs in a health maintenance organization are efficiency enhancing. They argue that group-based incentives can improve resource allocation efficiency due to their use of multiple experienced agents. Such an argument would extend naturally to teachers as well. teachers, which dilutes each worker's impact on the likelihood of receiving an award. Given the pervasive nature of group-based incentive pay in education and in the private sector, understanding how a person's share of the responsibility for the group interacts with worker behavior is critical to developing optimal merit pay systems. The structure of the HISD teacher incentive pay system for high school teachers provides an unusually clean test of the impact of the strength of group incentives on individual behavior that will allow us to help fill this gap in the literature.
III. The ASPIRE Teacher Incentive Pay Program
The Houston Independent School District is one of the largest school districts in the United States, with more than 200,000 students enrolled. The current incarnation of ASPIRE started in the 2007-2008 academic year, 13 when the district instituted a rank-order, value-added tournament at the subject-grade-school level based on student achievement growth on the Stanford Achievement Test and Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS). Teachers who taught core courses-math, English and language arts, reading, science, and social studies-each could receive up to $5,500 in payments above their base pay. The district contracted with the SAS Corporation to calculate student growth using the Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS). The system is based on a model developed by William Sanders and coauthors originally referred to as the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (Sanders, Saxton, & Horn, 1997; Wright, Sanders, & Rivers, 2006) . For department-based awards, where a department is defined by school-grade-subject, the model estimates the average department-grade-year test score growth that accounts for prior teachers' or departments' contributions to achievement. 14 This value-added measure is then ranked within grade, subject, and year. Departments that receive valueadded scores greater than 0 (indicating value-added greater than the mean) and are above the median value-added in their group receive an award. The award doubles if the department is within the top quartile of value-added.
Online appendix table 1 provides details on the awards available to teachers each year and the requirements for receiving them for high school teachers who teach core courses, the focus of this study. The awards are distributed 13 The initial program began in [2005] [2006] and contained a mix of schoollevel and individual teacher rewards. In the 2006-2007 academic year, all merit-based bonuses were awarded at the schoolwide or school-subject level. Our baseline analyses exclude these years, but we show in robustness checks that our estimates are robust to including them.
14 More precisely, department effects are estimated using a linear mixed model that regresses student achievement on a set of indicators for each subject-grade-school the student was enrolled in during the current and prior two years, as well as indicators for subject, grade, and year. The layered nature of the model means the estimated department effects can be interpreted as impacts on gains, akin to a first-difference value-added model that assumes no decay in the relationship between prior test scores on student achievement. See Ballou, Sanders, and Wright (2004) for a detailed technical discussion of the EVAAS model. such that each year there is a maximum award including a 10 percent bonus for perfect attendance by the teacher. The maximum for each teacher is $5,500 in 2007-2008 and rises to $7,700 by 2009-2010. The teacher is eligible for an award in each subject he or she teaches equal to the maximum award divided by the number of subjects taught. That amount is further divided by three, reflecting the three eligible grades: 9, 10, and 11. Thus, a teacher who teaches math and science is eligible for up to $1,283 in each of six award tournaments (each of ninth-through eleventh-grade math and science), amounting to $7,700 in total. Note that a teacher who does not instruct any students in a grade still is eligible for the award in that grade. For example, a teacher who teaches only tenth-grade science is eligible for all of the school's ninth-, tenth-, and eleventh-grade science awards. Despite the fact that teachers may receive bonus money due to the actions of teachers in other grades, the incentive system is designed such that each core teacher's own students enter into some award tournament. This setup means that every core high school teacher faces monetary incentives to get over an award threshold. 15
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15 This design also could lead teachers within a department to act strategically across grades by reducing performance in earlier grades in order to increase growth in later grades. Macartney (2013) offers evidence of such dynamic distortions in a value-added-based accountability program in North Carolina. To test this hypothesis, we have estimated models by grade to examine whether effects are indeed smaller in earlier grades. The results are inconsistent with this story as the impacts are almost entirely from ninthand tenth-grade students rather than eleventh graders. The tenth-grade estimates, while larger, generally are not statistically significantly different from the ninth-grade results. These results are provided in online appendix table A-2.
In addition to the departmental awards, there is a series of awards for schoolwide performance. 16 Each of the school awards is relatively small, ranging from $150 to $750 apiece; hence, we do not consider them in our analyses. Added to the department-specific award maximums discussed already, they raise the total award money a teacher could receive to $8,030 in 2007-2008 and $11,330 in 2009-2010 . The maximum award from all sources equals 20 percent of a beginning teacher's total wage compensation, with up to 14 percent from the department award portion. Even teachers at the highest step in the pay scale, $71,960, could have received up to 14 percent of their salary from incentive pay. The average award across all core teachers in HISD (including elementary and middle schools) was $3,614 in 2009-2010. The large bonus amounts relative to base pay suggest there is substantial scope in this system for teachers to respond to financial incentives.
One potential concern with the ASPIRE program is that the use of the EVAAS value-added methodology for determining award receipt might make the award formula complex and difficult for teachers to understand. However, there is some evidence that teachers in HISD were well informed and had a good understanding of the system. In surveys conducted by the district, teachers were asked about their level of understanding of the program parameters. 17 Although the surveys had relatively low response rates (30 to 50 percent), those who responded generally indicated that they understood the program. For example, in May 2009, 90 percent of teachers indicated they had very high, high, or sufficient understanding of the program. Nonetheless, we note that teachers do not need to fully understand the value-added system in order to respond to the incentives we study in this paper. A sufficient condition for us to detect responses to student share incentives is that teachers understand that increasing their students' achievement on specific tests leads to an increase in value-added and that their students' contribution to the valueadded score is proportional to the share of students they teach in the given subject and grade. Since detailed documents that explain the value-added system are easily accessible to teachers online, we believe this condition likely is met and, if anything, a lack of understanding would bias us toward not finding effects.
The survey responses also provide some insight into whether teachers responded to the incentives in the ASPIRE program. In May 2009, teachers were asked a series of questions about whether they agree that the award program changed various aspects of their teaching. In each case, at least 47 percent of teachers responded that they changed a particular aspect. For example, 47 percent of teachers indicated they devoted more time to professional development, while 60 percent indicated they used value-added data to make instructional decisions.
IV. Data
Our data come from matched student and teacher records that cover the 2002-2003 through 2009-2010 academic years. Since the department-level awards are provided only in high school, we restrict our analysis to grades 9 through 11 (students in grade 12 are not tested unless they fail the grade 11 exams). We further restrict the analysis sample to 2003-2004 and after to allow us to control for prior achievement. The data include achievement results from two types of exams. The first is Texas's criterion-referenced exam used for accountability, the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS). 18 The second exam type is the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT), a nationally normed standardized exam. This exam is low stakes, since it does not contribute to accountability or graduation requirements. For both types of exams, we standardize the scale scores within grade, subject, and year to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
In addition to the achievement tests, the data have information on student course taking, demographics, and grades.
Students are linked to teacher IDs via course records, and teachers are matched to awards based on a list compiled in 2009 of courses that count for each award. 19 Each observation in the data is for a student-course unit. As a result, some students who take multiple courses in a subject with either the same or different teachers will be observed multiple times. In order to ensure that such students are not given excess influence on the estimates, we assign weights to each observation equal to the inverse of the number of courses the student takes in a subject and year. 20 The data are split into four subjects: math, English and language arts (ELA), science, and social studies. Teachers for each of these subjects are eligible for the departmental awards. Reading and ELA scores are combined for the award tournaments; students who take reading enter into the departmental value-added calculation based on reading scores, while students who take ELA courses enter based on language scores. However, very few students take reading courses in high school. Thus, only students who take an ELA course are included in our analysis of ELA scores. 21 A particularly useful aspect of our data is that they include both a series of incentivized and nonincentivized exams. In particular, the incentives are linked to TAKS exams when one is given; if no TAKS exam is provided in a subject or grade, the incentives are based off Stanford scores. For math, TAKS is always incentivized, for English the Stanford language exam is incentivized, and for science and social studies, incentives are attached to Stanford in grade 9 and TAKS in grades 10 and 11. Thus, we use Stanford math and Stanford reading in all grades, along with Stanford science and social studies in grades 10 and 11, to test whether incentive-strength effects spill over into nonincentivized exams.
We assign teachers to students based on current academic year assignments for both spring and fall for all subjects. The TAKS exam is given in late March or early April, making the appropriate teachers for this exam the fall and spring teachers of the current school year. The Stanford exam is given in January, however, making the appropriate teacher assignment more ambiguous. We use the same assignment throughout for purposes of consistency as well as because for the January exam, the spring semester teachers in academic year t can influence the score through test preparation, extra teaching sessions, and review for the exams. Since there is ambiguity 19 Course names were standardized across the district in 2006-2007 and remained consistent afterward. However, prior to 2006-2007 some courses had different names. Additionally, some new courses were created and old courses discontinued. Generally this is not a problem since the awards are based only off of core subjects-math, science, social studies, English and language arts, and reading-for which course offerings change little over time. We visually inspected courses that did not match directly to the list to determine whether they should be included as an award eligible course had the ASPIRE program existed at the time. 20 Results are similar without weighting and are provided in online appendix table A-2. 21 Since reading scores contribute to award determination, teacher shares for ELA teachers are calculated as the number of students that teacher has in ELA courses divided by the total number of students in ELA and reading courses in the grade.
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about how best to link Stanford tests to teachers, we provide robustness checks from models that link students to the fall teacher of year t and the spring teacher from year t −1, as well as estimates that use only the fall semester teachers. These results are provided in online appendix table A-2 and show that our results are robust to the specific manner in which we match teachers and students.
Since HISD had an individual award system for high school in 2005-2006, we drop this year from our main analysis because it is unclear whether this should be considered a treatment or comparison year. Furthermore, we drop 2006-2007 because awards during this year were based on schoolwide value added in a subject rather than grade-level value-added. Nonetheless, we will show later that including these years with 2005-2006 as a "pre" year and 2006-2007 as a "post" year has little impact on our estimates. 22 We further limit the sample by dropping charter schools and alternative schools as the former tend to be very small and the latter serve special populations. In both cases, this makes these schools relatively incomparable to traditional high schools. We also drop observations for all teachers who instruct fewer than ten students in a subject, as these are likely to be part-time teachers who are ineligible for the awards. Finally, we exclude teachers for whom more than 80% of their students are limited English proficient (LEP) or more than 80% are special education, because these classes tend to be small and specialized. For each of these sample restrictions, we estimate models without the restriction and find results, described in more detail below, that are similar to baseline. Our final sample includes approximately 240,000 student-course observations in 33 high schools with between 263 and 356 teachers in each subject per year. Table 1 provides summary statistics and exact observation counts from the data, split by subject. In general, student characteristics are similar regardless of the subject. This result is not surprising, as most students are required to take at least one course in math, science, social studies, and ELA each year. Note that the smaller sample size for English is due to the exclusion of students in reading classes. HISD is a heavily minority district; only 11% of high school students are white. The racial composition is mainly a mix of Hispanic (54%) and black (31%) students. Students in HISD also are relatively low income; 70% are economically disadvantaged. 23 In panel B we see that, on average, teachers are responsible for between 12% and 14% of students in a subject-grade, and there are between twelve and fifteen teachers in each grade and subject. Because most of these teachers teach multiple grades (and often subjects), the total number of core teachers in each school-forty on average-is fewer than the sum across grades and subjects. 24
V. Empirical Methodology
Our empirical analysis focuses on testing a central implication of the group incentive pay models of Holmstrom (1982) and Kandel and Lazear (1992) : workers should be more responsive to a given monetary incentive when they are responsible for a larger share of the output. However, some unique aspects of teaching, such as the desire for cooperation and peer monitoring, may counteract this prediction. We identify whether teachers who are responsible for a larger share of students increase test scores more post-ASPIRE than pre-ASPIRE using a difference-in-difference model. If students were randomly assigned to classrooms, we could simply compare teachers with higher and lower shares after program implementation. But since both students and teachers sort nonrandomly into classrooms, we need to control for underlying characteristics of students and teachers that might be correlated with their teachers' shares. We use administrative data from HISD on student test scores, student demographics, and teacher assignments as described in section IV to estimate the following model, separately by subject,
where A igjst is test score of student i in grade g with teacher j in school s and year t, Share is the proportion of students in a given subject teacher j teaches in year t and grade g (i.e., in a given department and year), Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incentive pay program is in effect (2007) (2008) 25 The vector X contains student demographic characteristics, 24 Note that the mean share is not equal to the inverse of the number of teachers because the total number of teachers includes teachers who teach classes with high LEP rates or special education rates. However, the average teacher share tabulation excludes these classes, which tend to be smaller. Thus, the average teacher share in table 1 is larger than the inverse of the department size because the latter excludes many small classes while the former counts those teachers as part of the department. 25 Results are similar if we use 2002-2003 achievement as the lagged score for all years and grades and are provided in online appendix table A-2. Furthermore, in results available on request, we use once-lagged test scores as controls for all students. These results are extremely similar to our baseline ones and to those in appendix table A-2, which suggests that the specific manner in which we control for prior test scores is not driving our results. such as race, gender, participation in special education, participation in gifted and talented programs, limited English proficiency, and whether the student is economically disadvantaged. In addition to these controls, equation (1) contains grade-by-year fixed effects (λ gt ) and school-by-year fixed effects (ν st ). We estimate this model separately for math, English, science, and social studies tests. Because of the likelihood that errors are correlated across students within schools and within schools over time, all estimates in the analysis are accompanied by standard errors that are clustered at the school level. 26 The coefficient of interest in equation (1) is β 2 , which shows how the effect of teacher share shifts when the incentive pay program is implemented. In order to interpret β 2 as a causal estimate, we must control for the non-random sorting of students into classes with different teacher shares as well as the assignment of differing shares to teachers with varying underlying abilities. It is important to emphasize that we control for lagged student test scores. To the extent that these scores pick up fixed differences in student academic ability, any residual selection would have to be a function of student test score growth, not student test score levels. Critically, we also control for Share, which estimates the underlying relationship between teacher share and student academic achievement in the absence of the incentive pay program, conditional on the extensive set of controls in our model. There are several reasons to believe that there will be a preexisting correlation between Share and test score growth: principals may generate better teacher-student match quality for teachers with a higher share or might assign the best teachers to teach the higher-share classes. Conversely, teachers with higher shares may perform worse if the larger volume of students has a negative impact on performance. The parameter β 1 picks up this underlying relationship between teacher share and student achievement. The parameter of interest, β 2 , is identified off of any change in this relationship when the ASPIRE program comes into place. The main identifying assumption we invoke is not that Share is exogenous (i.e., β 1 = 0) but that the reason for any change in the relationship between teacher share and student outcomes when ASPIRE is enacted is due to teachers' responses to the incentives they face under the program and not due to changes in the sorting mechanism that drives any pre-ASPIRE correlation between Share and test scores.
In assessing the plausibility of this identification assumption, it is helpful to clarify the sources of variation in teacher share that are used to identify β 2 . Conditional on the fixed effects in equation (1), one source of variation in Share comes from year-to-year differences in share within teachers over 26 Clustering standard errors still may cause one to over-reject null hypotheses when the number of clusters is small (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2008; Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan, 2004) . Using Monte Carlo simulations, Bertrand et al. (2004) show only very small overrejection rates with twenty clusters and Cameron et al. (2008) find similar results with thirty clusters. These simulations suggest that clustering our standard errors at the school level will not be problematic for the purposes of hypothesis testing, as we have 33 clusters.
time. The share of students for whom a given teacher is responsible may vary from year to year due to population variation, idiosyncratic demand differences for specific subjects across cohorts, and teacher turnover. The variation in Share in equation (1) also comes from differences in teacher share across different classes taught by the same teacher in different grades and across different teachers within and across grades. 27 With these different sources of share variation being used to identify β 2 , two main types of bias can confound our identification strategy. First, there may be changes in student sorting post-ASPIRE such that students with different test score growth patterns are differentially matched post-ASPIRE relative to pre-ASPIRE into classrooms with teachers who teach a larger (or smaller) share of students. Note that simply reshuffling students to match those with higher underlying test score growth to higher-share teachers would not affect the likelihood of award receipt, because departmentaverage test scores would be unaffected by such changes. The only type of re-sorting that schools could engage in to raise department-level achievement would be to increase the match quality between higher-share teachers and students or to increase share among higher-productivity teachers post-ASPIRE. Such re-sorting still would generate a positive causal effect of the program on department-average test scores, but it would be coming through more efficient student and teacher assignments rather than through increasing teacher effort. Thus, even in the case of shifting student-teacher matching, we still would be identifying the causal effect of ASPIRE on student test scores and how this effect varies with teacher share. Second, principals may be altering teacher assignments such that more productive teachers receive higher shares post-ASPIRE. Again, this change would reflect an aggregate productivity increase due to the ASPIRE program, but it would be coming through changing teacher assignments rather than through increases in teacher effort across the share distribution.
We address these core endogeneity concerns in three ways. First, we show direct evidence using our extensive set of student observables and longitudinal information on teachers that there was no change in the relationship between student observable characteristics or pre-ASPIRE teacher value-added and share post-ASPIRE. This is strong evidence that the two types of sorting concerns discussed above are not present in our data. Second, we estimate equation (1) using different fixed effects that each isolate different aspects of the identifying share variation. Our preferred model includes school-year and grade-year fixed effects and thus relies on variation within schools at a particular point in time. We also estimate the model using school-grade-year (i.e., department) fixed effects that allow only share variation across teachers in the same department and year along with models that include 27 In online appendix table A-3, we provide results from an analysis of variance for teacher share. After accounting for observables and all fixed effects in our model, the results indicate that depending on the subject, between 40 percent and 58 percent of the remaining variance in teacher share is across teachers, while the rest is within teachers over time. Each cell comes from a separate estimation of equation (2) and shows the estimate of α2, which is the coefficient on Share × Post. Regressions also include school-year and grade-year fixed. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%. teacher-year fixed effects. The latter model is identified only off share variation within teachers across grades in the same subject and year. Each of these fixed-effects estimates provides similar results to those from equation (1). These results indicate that our main estimates are not being driven by changes in the mechanism that sorts students to teachers when ASPIRE comes into place, as each of these sources of teacher share variation are subject to biases from very different sorting mechanisms. 28 Third, we estimate models that use 1 2004 Department Size as well as teacher-specific pre-ASPIRE share levels as instruments for Share × Post. By employing only pre-ASPIRE variation in share, these models cannot be biased by any endogenous changes in student or teacher sorting post-ASPIRE. That all of these models yield similar estimates, combined with the direct evidence on student and teacher sorting presented below, suggests that our results are identifying teacher effort changes in response to ASPIRE incentives.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
We now examine directly whether student composition, measured academic achievement, or measured pre-ASPIRE teacher value-added shifted as a function of share post-ASPIRE. In table 2, we present balancing tests that show the correlation between our key explanatory variable and demographic characteristics of students. In particular, we estimate regressions of the following form:
where x is a specific student characteristic and all other variables are as previously defined. The estimates in table 2 suggest there were no significant changes in the relationship between student demographics and teacher share when ASPIRE was implemented. We test whether there are impacts on gender, race, economic status, at-risk status, special education, LEP, and gifted and talented status. We also examine the impact of ASPIRE on pre-treatment achievement levels and gains (one-year growth in test scores). In no case are these estimates significant at the 5% level, and only one, LEP status for science exams, is significant at the 10% level. The one potentially troublesome estimate is for science achievement. While not statistically significant, it is large and indicates that teachers with higher shares tend to get higher-achieving students in science. While this result may give us some pause in the interpretation of the science results, it is nonetheless comforting that we see no similar estimates in any of the three other subjects, and in fact the math and English point estimates have negative signs. We further stress that we control for lagged achievement and other student observables in all of our models, which helps address the potential sorting in science. Indeed, in the achievement value-added estimates, the science estimate drops substantially and remains insignificant, as do the estimates for the other exams. Thus, there is little evidence in our data of sorting post-ASPIRE based on pre-ASPIRE test score growth.
The second identification concern is that teacher shares could have adjusted in response to the awards. For example, a principal may decide that in order to maximize award receipt, she will increase shares for good teachers while decreasing shares for low-performing teachers. 30 While principals have very limited ability in HISD to fire teachers due to low valueadded, this goal could be achieved by assigning teachers in core subjects to teach in noncore subjects instead or to teach lower-share core classes. Such reassignment is likely to be difficult, however, as by high school, most teachers specialize in specific subjects and have high levels of specific human capital in those subjects, which makes it costly for them to switch.
We check the empirical relevance of this theory by assessing whether higher-quality teachers were assigned higher shares post-ASPIRE. We link teachers over time to calculate teacher value added for a subset of teachers. Unfortunately, while we have unique teacher IDs for 2006-2007 and later, prior to 2006-2007 , the teachers were not linked by ID numbers over time or as they changed schools. For these years, we have teacher names and gender, but we were unable positive) in estimates using teacher-year fixed effects, these results are not consistent across the different specifications and would produce biases in different directions. We thus view these few significant coefficients as reflecting spurious correlations rather than systematic selection.
30 A related concern is that the better teachers with higher shares pre-ASPIRE will get even higher shares post-ASPIRE. If this were the case, we would expect to see the teacher share distribution becoming more bimodal, with more high-share and low-share teachers (and few in-between). Online appendix figure A-1 shows teacher share distributions pre-and post-ASPIRE by subject; there is no evidence of such a change, as the share distribution remains remarkably stable across regimes. 31 Second, matching by names leaves us with some teachers with the same name who will be grouped together and some teachers who change names, mostly due to marriage, who will be identified as two separate teachers.
With these caveats in mind, we calculate teacher valueadded using data prior to the implementation of ASPIRE. 32 The last row of table 2 provides the estimates for the impact of teacher share after ASPIRE implementation on teacher value-added. For all four exams, the point estimates are small in magnitude and are not statistically different from 0 at conventional levels. 33 We also highlight that, if sorting based on pre-ASPIRE teacher quality were occurring, we would expect effects to show up on both the incentivized and nonincentivized exams. However, we show in table 5 that there is no change in the impact of share on achievement on nonincentivized exams post-ASPIRE. Overall, we find no evidence that teachers with higher pre-ASPIRE performance were being given higher shares when the incentive pay program was implemented. This evidence directly supports our identification strategy and preferred interpretation of the results.
VI. Results

A. Baseline Estimates
Before presenting our estimates of equation (1), we examine the correlation between teacher share and achievement 31 Panel 4 of table 4 shows the estimates of equation (1) using this linked sample of teachers are similar to the baseline results. 32 In particular, we estimate the following model for each subject, applying the weights described in section IV: A igjst = γ 0 +γ 1 A igj,t−1 +X it Φ+λ gt +ν st + ε igjst . For each grade, we use the standardized score on the exam that would eventually be used to determine ASPIRE awards. After estimating this equation using data from 2003-04 and 2004-05, we generate residuals for each student-course linkage and average over all (weighted) observations for each teacher. These average residuals are used as the teacher value-added dependent variable in table 2. 33 In online appendix table A-5, we provide estimates of the impacts of share on whether a student is new to the school or was not enrolled in the district in the prior year. In the former case, only the math sample shows a significant effect at the 10% level, while only the science sample shows significant effects for the latter. We also look at whether the number of courses taught by a teacher is correlated with Post × Share and only the English estimate is significant at even the 10% level, but the coefficient is positive. Having more courses requires more work on the part of teachers, and so without any effort, adjustment achievement should be lower. Thus, we would expect that if anything, this effect would generate a downward bias in the English estimates. 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
-Effects of Teacher Share by Year
Data for social studies in 2006-07 are unavailable. Each point shows the average effect in a given year of raising the proportion of students a teacher is responsible for by 0.1 on standardized student test scores. These estimates come from models that include school-year and grade-year fixed effects, as well as controls for lagged student test scores and student demographics. The bars extending from each point show the 95% confidence interval of each estimate that is calculated from standard errors clustered at the school level.
by year in order to see whether there are pretreatment trends and whether a break in any pretreatment relationship between these variables is evident around 2006-2007 when the group incentive pay system started. We estimate models similar to equation (1) Prior to 2006, teacher share had no relationship with student achievement; after the incentive pay system was enacted, teachers who were responsible for more students performed better than those responsible for fewer students. The estimates for English also show a clear level shift after 2005. For science and social studies, 34 the year-by-year estimates after 2006 are more mixed. Nonetheless, the figures show that there is no trend in estimated effects of teacher share 34 We do not have data for performance on the state exam in social studies for 2006-07, so we omit that year from the social studies regressions. prior to implementation of ASPIRE, providing support for our difference-in-differences identification strategy. Indeed, F-tests of the joint significance of the pre-ASPIRE years (2003-04 through 2005-06) do not reject the null of equality, with test statistics of 0.3, 0.0, 0.0, and 0.0 for math, English, science, and social studies, respectively. The figure also provides evidence that the ASPIRE program generated a positive shift in the relationship between teacher share and achievement, particularly for math. Table 3 presents the baseline estimates of equation (1). The estimates in each column of each panel come from separate regressions, and all regressions include controls for observables along with school-year and grade-year fixed effects. In panel 1, we show pooled estimates for all teachers in the sample. In math, English, and social studies, the estimates are statistically significant, with impacts of around 0.02 standard deviations for a 10 percentage point increase in share.
A question of high policy importance is whether incentivizing teachers has different impacts on high-or low-performing students. If so, then incentive pay could either lessen or exacerbate achievement disparities within a district. Prior work on teacher incentive pay in the United States has HISD administrative data as described in the text. The math test in the first column is the state-administered TAKS math exam. The language exams are Stanford tests. For tenth-and eleventh-grade science and social studies, the TAKS exams are used, while for ninth grade, Stanford tests are used. All estimates are in terms of scale scores standardized across the district within grade and year. Individual controls are included in all specifications and include student gender, race, at-risk, special education, LEP, gifted status, and lagged student test scores interacted with grade-by-year indicators. All models also include grade-year and school-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%. not examined heterogeneous effects by prior student performance, and thus in panels 2 and 3 of table 3, we present some of the first evidence in the literature on such heterogenous impacts.
To test for heterogeneity by achievement levels, we first calculate the mean once-lagged achievement for the students in a teacher's classes. Then we rank-order the teachers by mean prior achievement of their students and split the sample at the median of this distribution. Panel 2 provides estimates for below-median teachers. The impacts on math, English, and social studies are statistically significant and are between 0.02 and 0.04 standard deviations for a 10 percentage point increase in share. The estimates in panel 3 for above-median teachers are much smaller and are not significant in any subject. These results indicate that teachers with low-achieving students are more responsive to changes in incentive strength, which suggests that incentives may help narrow achievement gaps. 35 We also provide the estimates on Share in table 3 that show how teacher share and student test scores were correlated prior to ASPIRE. Our identification strategy is unaffected by any preexisting correlation between achievement and share, but it still is of interest to examine the strength and sign of any pre-ASPIRE relationship among these variables. Pre-ASPIRE, teacher share was only weakly positively correlated with math and English test scores, conditional on the controls in the model. The correlations are positive and larger in magnitude for science and social studies. Thus, for math and English, the ASPIRE program generated a 35 Interestingly, we also estimate models using the achievement level of each student and found that the estimates did not differ substantially by above-and below-median students. This suggests that teachers do not necessarily target low-achieving students; rather, when there is a critical mass of low achievers taught by a teacher, he or she responds more.
positive relationship between test scores and teacher share, while for social studies, it strengthened a preexisting positive relationship.
B. Estimates Using Different Sources of Teacher Share Variation
Our main identifying assumption is that the underlying relationship between teacher share and student performance is not shifting endogenously when the ASPIRE program is implemented. In addition to the direct evidence we show in section V that student characteristics and pre-ASPIRE valueadded are not changing as a function of share, we provide further support for our identification strategy by exploring the sensitivity of the results to different sources of share variation that each is subject to potential biases from different sorting mechanisms. Our preferred estimates in panel 1 of table 3 are identified off of a few sources of variation, although in all cases, the estimates are based on variation in the post-ASPIRE period relative to the pre-ASPIRE period in order to exploit the implementation of the award system. Differences in share across teachers within departments and year are one important component of the identifying variation. The second core variation source is differences in share distributions in a given year within schools but across grades. Third, differences in share within teachers and year but across grades contribute to identification. In order to investigate the role of these multiple sources of variation, in table 4 we estimate models that eliminate or isolate specific sources. Showing that our estimates are robust to using different types of share variation supports the validity of our identification strategy, as it is unlikely that there is a reasonable sorting mechanism that would affect all of these sources in the same way. HISD administrative data as described in the text. The math test in column 1 is the state-administered TAKS math exam. The Language exams are Stanford tests. For tenth-and eleventh-grade science and social studies, the TAKS exams are used, while for ninth-grade, they are Stanford tests. All estimates are in terms of scale scores standardized across the district within grade and year. All models include grade-year fixed effects and the following individual controls: student gender, race, at-risk, special education, LEP, gifted status, and lagged student test scores interacted with grade-by-year indicators. In panel 4, OLS estimates include school-year fixed effects while 2SLS instead include school fixed effects due to the limited variation within school-years of the instrument. Further, panel 4 includes only teachers who taught core classes in 2004 and were in HISD in 2006. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
In the first panel of table 4, we control for school-gradeyear (i.e., department-year) fixed effects as well as the controls included in equation (1). This model is identified only off differences in share between teachers in the same department and year. Thus, it does not use identifying variation from differences in share across grades in a school, which is important if principals are funneling extra resources to grades that have a few high-share classes. Furthermore, it implicitly controls for any direct impact of department size and any department-level shocks that do not work through share. The resulting estimates are similar to the baseline estimates.
In panel 2 of table 4, we provide a set of estimates that rely solely on variation within teacher and year by including teacher-year fixed effects in equation (1). The unique design of the ASPIRE program leaves many teachers with different incentives across grades, depending on the proportion of students they teach in each grade. For example, a math teacher may instruct 50 percent of ninth-grade math students and only 20 percent of tenth graders yet be eligible for the same award amount in both grades. Thus, the teacher will face stronger ninth-grade incentives than tenth-grade incentives. These estimates are of interest to the extent that they show teachers shifting focus or effort across grades due to the financial incentives they face. They also allow us to focus on this single source of share variation; the model eliminates any share variation across teachers and variation within teachers over time. The results are positive and significant for all four incentivized exams. These findings mirror the baseline estimates. The only estimate that is notably different from those in table 3 is science, which is now positive and significant. These results suggest that teachers do indeed shift focus across grades to the grade in which they have a higher share post-ASPIRE. They also provide further support for the contention that our estimates are driven by teacher responses to ASPIRE, as it is difficult to tell an alternative story that would lead to within-teacher and year increases in the relationship between share and student achievement post-ASPIRE. For example, these estimates suggest that our results are not being driven by increased resources being given to teachers with higher shares, as it is unlikely that principals can target resources in such a way that teachers can use them in only one grade. 36 In panels 3 and 4 of table 4, we provide two sets of IV estimates that instrument for Share × Post using pre-ASPIRE variation that is immune to post-ASPIRE sorting. In panel 3, we instrument Share and Share × Post with × Post. These estimates are identified solely off of share measures that exist prior to ASPIRE and are unrelated to teacher quality variation or student-teacher matching changes within a school-grade. The drawback of this instrument is that since there is very little within-school variation, we cannot use school fixed effects, and thus the estimates are subject to bias if schools with historically small departments tend to respond more to ASPIRE for reasons other than the impact of average share. Because of this limitation and the imprecision of the estimates, we do not use these as our preferred results. Nonetheless, the estimates are on the whole similar to our main results. Math and English estimates are positive and of the same order of magnitude as baseline. Science becomes positive and significant, which is similar to the results in panel 2 of table 4. These results suggest that if anything, our baseline estimates serve as a lower bound for science. For social studies, the estimates are positive but imprecise due to a weak first stage on "share."
In panel 4, we use Share 2004 as an instrument for Share and Share 2004 × Post as an instrument for Share × Post, where Share 2004 is the average 2004 share for a teacher in a given subject. Due to the need for longitudinal information about teachers to construct this instrument, we are restricted to using the matched teacher sample described in section V off of which the pre-ASPIRE teacher value-added estimates are calculated. Further, a lack of within-school-year variation forces us to discard school-year fixed effects in favor of school fixed effects. The first row of panel 4 shows our baseline model estimated using this matched sample. The estimates are very similar to those using the full sample, although they are less precise due to a smaller number of teachers. The only exception is a much larger estimate for social studies, but on the whole, the longitudinally matched teacher sample yields estimates that are consistent with the full sample results. The IV estimates shown in the fourth row of table 4 are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the associated OLS results, with the exception of the science estimates that are again much larger using this instrument. Despite the lack of statistical significance of these estimates, with teacher share. For policy purposes, this is the relevant parameter. But the interpretation of our estimates would differ: instead of being driven by changes in teacher effort, changes in resources also would play a role. While we believe our estimates are most consistent with effort changes by teachers as a function of share post-ASPIRE, our results are valid even in the presence of resource changes across the share distribution in response to ASPIRE. Related, teachers could be induced to cooperate due to ASPIRE, with low-share teachers providing additional support for high-share teachers around testing time. Such an effect would be consistent with our definition of teacher effort, but we also note that teacher-year fixed-effects estimates are inconsistent with such cooperative impacts being a first-order driver of the results unless there are no spillovers within teachers across grades to such cooperation. comparing the OLS and IV point estimates provides little support for the contention that the post-ASPIRE sorting of teachers or students is biasing our results. Overall, the results in table 4 show that our estimates are robust to using different sources of variation and support our claim that our preferred estimates in table 3 are not biased by changes in how students and teachers are matched when the incentive pay program is implemented.
C. Impacts on Nonincentivized Exams
A substantial advantage of our data is we have access to a series of nonincentivized exams. This is because, while the incentives are attached to TAKS exams in most grades and subjects, HISD administers Stanford Achievement Tests in all grades and subjects. Further, while English teachers are incentivized on the Stanford Language exam, incentives are not attached to the Stanford Reading exam. 37 Thus, in table 5, we provide estimates of the impacts on these exams: Stanford math, Stanford reading, and Stanford science and social studies in tenth and eleveth grades. These estimates help address whether the bonuses incentivize teachers to focus on specific tests or whether they lead to a general increase in knowledge. 38 From the first four columns of table 5, we see little evidence of spillover effects on the nonincentivized exams. All of the estimates are statistically insignificant, and the largest, if taken at face value, would indicate only an impact of 0.007 standard deviations for a 10 percentage point increase in share. In the last two columns, we provide estimates for the ninth grade Stanford science and social studies exams, which are incentivized. Both estimates are larger than those for the nonincentivized grades, with the science estimate being significant at the 10% level. These results, combined with the positive effects shown above on Stanford language exams, indicate that the null results in columns 1 through 4 are due to the lack of incentives rather than a characteristic of the Stanford exam itself. 39 A caveat to this result is that while the findings for nonincentivized exams could be indicative of teachers focusing specifically on the incentivized exam, it also is the case that the TAKS and Stanford exams have limited topical overlap. Since the curriculum is targeted toward TAKS, it may be that teachers focus on topics in the curriculum that are not well covered in the Stanford exam. 40 Nonetheless, the fact that performance on these nonincentivized exams did not decline as 37 Reading teachers are incentivized on the TAKS reading exam rather than on the Stanford reading exam. 38 Another possibility is that incentives encourage cheating. For example, Jacob and Levitt (2003) find nontrivial amounts of teacher cheating on standardized tests in Chicago in response to accountability incentives. 39 Estimates that split the sample as in panels 2 and 3 of table 3 show a significant impact only for teachers with low achievers in reading of 0.326 (SE 0.068). All other exams are statistically insignificant for teachers with high or low achievers. These results are available on request. HISD administrative data as described in the text. Individual controls are included in all specifications and include student gender, race, at-risk, special education, LEP, gifted status, and lagged student test scores interacted with grade-by-year indicators. Grade-by-year and school-by-year fixed effects are also included. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%. a function of share post-ASPIRE suggests that teachers were not completely shifting their focus to the incentivized exam. In addition, the fact that the relationship between nonincentivized exam scores and share does not shift post-ASPIRE also provides support for our main identification assumption that principals did not sort students differentially into classrooms as a function of share post-ASPIRE. Such a change in sorting should show up on all test scores, not just on the incentivized exams.
D. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Teacher Share
Thus far, we have estimated the mean effect of increasing teacher share under a group incentive pay regime over the entire distribution of shares. However, these estimates may hide important information, as the effect of share may be larger among those with lower shares. 41 This possibility comes from the fact that free-riding incentives can fall nonlinearly with share increases and that we would expect the marginal benefit of effort to be decreasing in total effort. Thus, as share increases, effort would be expected to increase at a decreasing rate. To test for heterogeneous responses as a function of share, we estimate local linear regressions of the effect of teacher share post-2006 on achievement at different parts of the share distribution in figure 2. This method allows us to examine nonparametrically how the effect of teacher share changes when the incentive pay system is implemented. 42 The figure shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a series of regressions of equation (1) centered at each percentage point of the teacher share distribution and restricted to a bandwidth of 0.15 on each side using a rectangular (uniform) kernel. We show regression estimates up to a share of 0.5, as sample sizes become too small at larger shares for reasonable inference. Since 95% of the distribution has a 41 In previous versions of this paper, we presented an illustrative theoretical model that shows that this prediction comes out of a simple model in which teacher heterogeneity is solely a function of exogenously assigned share. In order to keep the focus of our study on the empirical results, we refer readers who are interested in details of the model to Imberman and Lovenheim (2012) . 42 While there is parametric structure on the linear models we estimate, we impose no structure on the heterogeneity with respect to teacher share. share below 0.4, the standard errors tend to grow considerably at larger shares. 43 Figure 2 shows evidence of a large amount of heterogeneity in effects as a function of share: the estimate for Share × Post starts out positive at low shares and then falls to 0 for all four subjects. 44 In particular, for a teacher with a share close to 0, the impact on achievement from increasing share by 0.1 is between 0.05 and 0.09 standard deviations. With the exception of language, all estimates are statistically significantly different from 0 from a 0.0 share to a 0.2 share. The point estimates first cross the 0 effect line between 0.2 and 0.3 in each subject, including ELA. Hence, figure 2 shows that achievement increases substantially for teachers who are responsible for small shares of the class as that share increases; that is, the marginal impact of increasing share falls as the teacher's share increases. The effects of a 10-point increase in share at low shares are sizable, representing about one-quarter to a half of the effect of reducing class sizes by seven (Krueger, 1999) , and are about the same size as a 1 standard deviation increase in teacher quality (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004) . 45 If the pattern of marginal effects across the share distribution we show in figure 2 is due to teachers responding to the incentives they face under the ASPIRE program, we should see less evidence of such a pattern in the pre-ASPIRE period. In online appendix figure A-5, we present local linear regression estimates from the Share main effect coefficient. For math, English, and science, the effect of teacher share does not decline with share in the same manner as shown in figure  2 . For social studies, the effect does look similar, but we note that the results shown in figure 2 are in addition to this preexisting relationship. Thus, for three of the four subjects, share increases became positively related to test performance at 43 In online appendix figure A-2, we provide figures that use a bandwidth of 0.1 instead of 0.15. Although the estimates are noisier, the basic pattern remains.
44 While there appears to be an uptick for math starting at around 0.3, the lack of precision at this range prevents us from being able to test whether this is a true effect. Except for a small range around 0.4, these estimates are not statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level. 45 Not surprisingly, given the estimates in table 3, when we split the samples by teachers with high-and low-achieving students in online appendix figures A-3 and A-4, teachers with low-achieving students show similar, if stronger, patterns to those in figure 2, while those for high-achieving students are relatively flat, around 0. lower shares post-ASPIRE, while for social studies, this positive relationship at lower shares strengthened considerably after ASPIRE was implemented.
The estimates in figure 2 do not lend themselves easily to statistical tests that the effect of share on test scores post-ASPIRE declines with share. Thus, in online appendix table A-6, we estimate equation (1) separately for teachers with shares above and below 0.15 and then test for the equality of the Post × Share coefficients. As table A-6 demonstrates, the effect of increasing share post-ASPIRE among teachers with shares less than 0.15 is much larger than among teachers with shares more than 0.15. For English, science, and social studies, this difference is statistically significant at the 5% level, and for math the p-value is 0.11.
Although we model the teacher response as a function of the share of the students they teach, there also is a potential direct role for the department size. For example, if teachers monitor each other's performance, the number of teachers in each department should be directly related to teacher effectiveness. 46 It also is possible that group-based incentives induce more cooperation, which would increase the aggregate productivity of the group. Jackson and Bruegmann (2009) and Goldhaber and Hansen (2013) both show evidence of peer effects in teaching, which could be amplified by a groupbased incentive scheme. Such peer effects are more likely to be a function of department size rather than of share, since the incentives to work together will decline with the number of people in the group rather than the share split across teachers conditional on the size of the group. 47 Our ability to separately examine share versus department size effects is unique to this setting and provides new evidence on the mechanisms through which group incentives operate.
In figure 3 , we provide local linear regressions of equation (1) with the addition of a variable for the number of teachers in the department (DepartmentSize) and its interaction with being in the ASPIRE period (Post×DepartmentSize). The left column shows the impact estimates for teacher share, while monitoring as well. This would be one potential mechanism that would lead to higher effort among higher-share teachers post-ASPIRE. 47 Note that our estimates in table 4 that use only share variation across teachers within a group and year are inconsistent with large cooperation effects, as cooperation should raise the performance of all members of the group, not just the high-share teachers. the right column shows impact estimates for department size. Department size has an independent significant effect only on language scores post-ASPIRE. For ELA, department size has a slight positive effect independent of share, suggesting some potential benefits to having a larger group for this subject. The inclusion of these additional controls strengthens the share results as well across all subjects. In particular, the estimates for language are now statistically significantly different from 0 at shares between 0.0 and 0.2, and social studies effects stay positive at slightly higher levels of teacher share. Most important, however, is that the graphs show the same downward-sloping relationship between the effect estimate and share as in figure 2. These results indicate that teachers are for the most part responding directly to incentive strength rather than being influenced by other factors associated with different department sizes, a unique finding in this literature. Furthermore, these results show that teacher share is a stronger proxy for incentive strength than is department size, which is what has been used previously to examine freeriding effects in education and other labor markets. Our data thus allow us to identify how teachers respond to group-based incentives with much more precision than has been feasible in previous analyses by exploiting within-group incentive strength variation.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
The estimates in figures 2 and 3 are particularly important because they provide information about achievementmaximizing shares. Once teacher shares reach 0.2 to 0.3, there are no more returns to increasing shares (i.e., decreasing group size) in HISD's group-based incentive pay system. These findings imply that group-based incentive pay systems will produce larger test score gains either when sufficiently small groups are used or when students are reallocated across teachers to avoid having teachers with low shares. In the context of the previous literature on group-based teacher incentive pay, our results suggest that school-level incentive programs may have little effect on teacher behavior because each teacher's share is so low that the incentive she faces is too weak.
While we see clear decreasing marginal effects of share increases for the incentivized exams, there is little evidence of impacts at any point of the share distributions for nonincentivized exams, as shown in figure 4 . Estimates for almost all points on the distributions for each of the four nonincentivized exams are statistically insignificant and close to 0. These results indicate that there are no spillovers from the incentives to same-subject nonincentivized exams at any point on the share distribution.
E. The Effect of ASPIRE on Average Student Test Scores
Although the primary goal of this paper is to estimate how teacher responses to financial incentives vary with the strength of those incentives as proxied by Share, it also is of interest to estimate the impact of the program on average test 382 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Local-linear-based calculations integrate the total effect of incentive pay for each teacher from the set of marginal effects of increased share from local linear regressions in figure 2. Pooled OLS-based calculations take the estimates from panel 1 of table 3 and multiply them by the teacher's share in that subject, grade, and year. The estimated total effects are then averaged across all relevant students in grades 9 to 11 from 2007-08 through 2009-10, weighted by the inverse of the number of teachers each student has in a subject so that each student counts only once. Columns 1 and 4 use the point estimates from the regressions as the estimated marginal effect. Columns 2 and 5 use the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval from those regressions, while columns 3 and 6 use the lower bound of the 95 percentage confidence intervals.
scores. Unfortunately, with only one treated district, we are limited in our ability to identify such average effects. However, we can use our incentive strength estimates to calculate a likely lower-bound effect of the program on student academic achievement. The insight underlying this calculation is that our share estimates provide us with ∂Score igjst ∂Share gjst . We thus can recover the main effect of ASPIRE on a given studentteacher pair up to an unknown constant by integrating over shares up to the teacher's share, that is,
Since we cannot calculate this integral directly, we estimate it using discrete analogs along with the estimated share effects. First, we use the linear model estimated in panel 1 of table 3. In this case, the total productivity effect for teacher j in grade g for a given subject is
While this estimate provides a useful baseline, the findings in figure 2 show substantial heterogeneity by share. Thus, we calculate total effects using the estimates from the local linear regressions in figure 2 as well. 48 In this case, the total productivity amounts to calculating the area under the curve in figure 2 from 0 to the share value for a given teacher and subject:
Note that in the summation above, the steps are of intervals equal to 0.01. The average effect of the program across all students is calculated by taking a weighted sum of equation (4) or (5) across students-course observations by subject, where the weights are the inverse of the number of courses each student takes in the given subject and year. 48 Although they are not shown in the figure due to large standard errors, for these calculations we include teachers with shares above 0.5.
A key limitation of this strategy is that the constant in equation (3) cannot be recovered, and in fact equations (4) and (5) assume that α gjt = 0. If in reality α gjt > 0, then we can consider our calculation to be a lower bound on the true impact of the program. It is possible, though, that α gjt < 0, which would imply that we overestimate the program effect. We think that this situation is particularly unlikely, however. For the constant to be negative, teachers would have to respond negatively to the existence of the program even when they respond positively to the incentives embedded within the program. There are few plausible scenarios that could generate such behavior. 49 With this caveat in mind, table 6 presents the average effect calculations using the effects implied by the point estimates as well as the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals from the underlying regressions. The estimates based on pooled difference-in-differences models indicate that ASPIRE increased test scores by 3 percent to 5 percent of a standard deviation for math, English, and social studies. There is no effect on average science achievement.
Although less precise, the calculations based on the local linear regressions are our preferred estimates because they are more flexible. These models provide considerably larger total effect sizes. For math, science, and social studies, our results suggest an average effect of ASPIRE of between 7 and 10 percent of a standard deviation, while English test scores increased by 3 percent of a standard deviation. These imply modest total effects equal to between one-quarter and one-half of the effect of reducing class sizes by seven students (Krueger, 1999) and are about the same size as a 1 standard deviation increase in teacher quality (Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004) . Given that they are likely to be lowerbound estimates, the results in Table 6 suggest that ASPIRE 49 One possibility is that the incentive pay program generates a culture in the school that is hypercompetitive, leading to an overall reduction in achievement even as teachers respond positively to the specific incentives they face. While this is a reasonable theory in the context of an individual incentive regime, we would expect the group-based nature of the award to reduce competitiveness considerably and replace it with cooperative behavior (Hamilton et al., 2003) . Another possibility is that teachers become jealous of others who win awards when they do not, which affects their productivity. The fact that awards are grouped by department and that teachers win money if other grades in the same subject and school win an award likely mutes this effect. HISD administrative data as described in the text. The math test in the first column is the state-administered TAKS math exam. The English and language arts exams are Stanford tests. For tenth-and eleventh-grade science and social studies, the TAKS exams are used, while for ninth grade, they are Stanford tests. All estimates are in terms of standardized scores. Controls include student gender, race, at-risk, special education, LEP, and gifted status along with lagged achievement interacted with grade-year indicators and grade-year and school-year fixed effects. To ease presentation, we do not show the estimate for the "teacher share" main effect. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10%.
had a sizable positive effect on student test scores in Houston, which is in contrast to many of the other recent findings on teacher incentive pay (Neal, 2011) .
Some back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit calculations provide additional context to the magnitude of these estimates. However, given that we find no impact on non incentivized exams, it is unclear how much of the impacts above translate into learning rather than better test taking. To the extent the latter is dominant and ifᾱ gjt = 0, this calculation reflects an upper bound to the benefits of the program.
To calculate benefits, we use the estimated impact of teacher value-added on earnings from Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013) and assume that the achievement gains induced by ASPIRE provide the same value. They estimate that a 1 standard deviation increase in teacher value-added corresponds to a 0.1 standard deviation increase in student achievement and increases earnings at age 28 by 1.3 percent. They point out that the mean present value of lifetime earnings at age 12 in the United States is $522,000, leading to a gain of around $7,000 per student per grade. 50 In the Houston context, with three incentivized grades, this implies approximately $21,000 per student increase in lifetime earnings for a 0.1 standard deviation increase in achievement. 50 These estimates are from page 24 of the paper.
Given that teachers in our data average between 76 and 91 students depending on the subject, using the more precise homogeneous models, we calculate returns of $500,000 per teacher-year for English and $750,000 for social studies, with math falling in-between. Though less precise, using the local linear regressions provides far larger estimates. These benefits far exceed the costs of up to $1,950 per teacher-year. 51 While these calculations rely on somewhat strong assumptions, the relative inexpensiveness of the incentive program makes it likely that the program passes a cost-benefit test.
F. Robustness Checks
As discussed in section V, the interpretation of the shift in the effect of teacher share post-ASPIRE as causal is predicated on our extensive set of fixed effects and student background controls being sufficient to account for any changes in the underlying relationship between teacher share and achievement growth coincidental with ASPIRE implementation. In table 7, we present a series of robustness checks, in addition to those in online appendix table A-2 that we 384 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS previously noted, which shed further light on the validity of this assumption.
First, we control for the number of students each teacher instructs in panel 1. A teacher who has more students may be able to benefit from economies of scale in responding to the awards. Including this variable has a negligible effect on our estimates, however.
HISD has a number of charter and alternative schools. Teachers in these schools are eligible for the incentive pay awards, but we exclude them from our main analysis because of the difficult selection problems associated with these schools, given that teachers, administrators, and students in these schools likely differ substantially from those in traditional public schools. When we include these schools, the estimates are attenuated for math, English and social studies, although they remain positive and statistically significant.
We excluded school years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 because in those years, the incentive pay system differed substantially from the subject-grade-specific tournaments of later years. When we add them back into the sample in panel 3, our estimates become attenuated because we are essentially adding measurement error. Nonetheless, the estimates are qualitatively similar to baseline. In panel 4, we relax our restriction on the minimum number of students teachers can have to be included in the regressions. The results change little. In panel 5, we add in teacher-courses with more than 80 percent special education or 80 percent LEP and find results that are in line with those shown in table 3. In panels 6 and 7, we drop all special education and LEP students, respectively, and find results similar to baseline.
A final concern relates to student tracking in high schools, which could bias our estimates if ASPIRE leads to differential changes in teacher shares across tracks (Jackson, 2014; Harris, Ingle, & Rutledge, 2014) . Protik et al. (2013) argue that controlling for the average and standard deviation of the lagged test score within each class adequately controls for tracking. We estimated models that use these controls and found results very similar to baseline. These results, available on request, suggest few concerns related to tracking for our estimates.
VII. Conclusion
Numerous school districts and states have implemented programs linking teacher compensation to student exam performance. Despite the widespread popularity of these programs, the evidence on their effectiveness is mixed. Particularly troublesome is that recent experimental analyses have found little impact of incentive pay on achievement. One potential explanation is that these programs are not designed in a way that induces teachers to respond to the incentives. Unfortunately, there is a lack of empirical examination of the optimal design of such programs. This paper takes a step in improving our understanding of the role of program design in the development of incentive pay programs by testing for individual teachers' responses to incentive strength in a group-based teacher incentive pay program in the Houston Independent School District. The program we study, called ASPIRE, provides a unique opportunity to examine how teachers respond to free riding, award salience, and collaboration and peer-monitoring incentives embedded within the program, since high school teachers are provided cash awards based on the performance of all students in the teacher's grade-school-subject cell. The cash awards are large, accounting for up to 14 percent of a teacher's total wage compensation. This is a useful program for studying teachers' responses to incentive strength since, unlike in cases where awards are determined on a school wide basis, there is substantial variation in the share of students within a gradesubject that a teacher instructs. We use the teacher share as a proxy for incentive strength and estimate difference-indifference models that identify the shift in the relationship between achievement and teacher share when the teacher incentive pay program is implemented. This work builds on previous analyses of teacher incentive pay by examining heterogeneous responses as a function of group size, which can inform optimal program design.
Our study establishes that group-based incentive pay is effective at raising student achievement on incentivized exams when the group sizes are small enough and that student achievement increases in response to stronger group incentives. On average, our preferred estimates indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in teacher share increases math and social studies achievement by 0.02 standard deviations and language scores by 0.014 standard deviations and has no effect on science. Most of these impacts come from teachers who instruct students with low average achievement levels. However, these average estimates hide a substantial amount of heterogeneity. Using local linear regression techniques, we find that at very low levels of teacher share, math, language, science, and social studies achievement increase by 0.05 to 0.09 standard deviations for each 10 percentage point increase in teacher share post-ASPIRE. This treatment effect fades out as teacher share increases and reaches 0 at teacher shares between 0.2 and 0.3. These results are indicative of substantial free riding or response to award salience when teachers are responsible for small portions of the relevant student population.
Our estimates are tempered by the fact that we see little impact on a series of nonincentivized exams in the same or closely related subjects to those that are incentivized. We find no significant impact in both linear and nonlinear models on nonincentivized math, reading, science, and social studies exams. These results suggest either that the gains from the incentives are due to improved test taking or that teachers focus on topics in the incentivized exams that are not well covered in the nonincentivized exams.
With that caveat, we calculate lower-bound estimates of the effect of ASPIRE on average student test scores in the incentivized exams. We find that the program had a large, positive effect on student performance in all subjects, with test scores increasing by between 3 and 10 percent of a standard deviation depending on the subject. Through a back-of-theenvelope calculation based on estimated returns to teacher value-added in Chetty et al. (2013) , we show that the benefits in terms of potential lifetime earnings gains from the department-based incentive portion of ASPIRE far exceed the costs. The differences between costs and benefits are so large that the program would likely be cost-effective even if only a small portion of the gains is due to actual learning rather than improved test-taking skills.
Our results suggest strongly that the design of group teacher incentives has important implications for productivity. In particular, the results indicate that when implementing group incentive pay, it is better to provide awards on the basis of small groups and that there is substantial potential for schools with group awards to improve productivity by reducing group size. Thus, ASPIRE could have been even more productivity enhancing than it was if it had used groups that minimized the number of teachers with shares below 0.2. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that it is unclear if our results would carry over to cases where the groups are not natural, that is, are not based on standard groupings like subject-grade or school.
It is tempting to extrapolate from our results that individual-based incentive awards should generate large, positive effects on achievement, which is at odds with the findings from existing experimental research (Fryer et al. 2012; Springer et al., 2010) . However, we believe such an extrapolation would be inappropriate because it this relies on out-of-sample predictions based on strong assumptions. In fact, there are a number of reasons to suspect the individual context is quite different from the group context, and thus our findings likely are not in conflict with the experimentbased individual awards results. First, individual awards may foster a competitive environment that is counterproductive if teaching efficiency benefits from cooperation and spillovers across teachers. Second, teacher value-added, on which most incentive awards are based, has the drawback of being very imprecise at the individual teacher level. 52 This almost certainly mutes teacher responsiveness to awards based on these measures. Thus, there is an inherent trade-off in the design of value-added-based incentive pay systems between the precision of the value-added estimates and the potential for free riding in group-based incentive schemes. We find teacher shares of 0.2 to 0.3 minimize free riding, suggesting that group-based incentives centered around small groups could provide a balance between the need for precision in the evaluation measure and the need to have sufficiently powerful incentives. Future work focusing on this trade-off would be of high value in informing optimal teacher incentive pay design.
